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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ROSE GIBBONS and 
AUSTIN K. TIERNAN, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
R. GL FRAZIER and 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Respondents. 
Application for Rehearing 
The petition of Rose Gibbons and Austin K. Tier-
nan, appellants above named, respectfully prays that the 
Court grant a rehearing of this appeal; and for grounds 
of their petition respectfully represent that it appears 
from its decision heretofore filed herein that the Court 
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I- ? 
Did not consider and decide all of the material ques-
tions involved in the case. 
II. 
Overlooked certain controlling decisions, which ought 
to affect the result. 
III. 
Based its decision on wrong principles of law. 
IV. 
Misapplied or overlooked divers matters of fact and 
of law which ought to materially affect the result. 
All of which will more fully appear from the brief 
following and respectfully submitted. 
Attorneys for Appellants and Petitioners. 
The undersigned, B. L. LIBERMAN, GEO. Y. WAL-
LACE and R. A. McBROOM, attorneys for Rose Gibbons 
and Austin K. Tiernan, appellants above named and par-
ties to the foregoing petition for rehearing, hereby each 
certify that in his opinion there is good reason to believe 
that the judgment of the Court heretofore filed herein is 
erroneous and that this cause ought to be re-examined. 
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In Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,172, the Court 
speaking by Mr. Justice Frick, said: 
"We desire to add a word in conclusion re-
specting the numerous applications for rehearings 
in this court. To make an application for a rehear-
ing is a matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions for re-
hearings in proper cases. Wlu.n this court, how-
ever, has considered and decided all of the mate-
rial questions involved in a case, a rehearing 
should not be applied for, unless we have miscon-
strued or overlooked some material fact or facts; 
or have overlooked some statute or decision which 
may affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have 
either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result. * * * If there 
are some reasons, however, such as we have indi-
cated above, or other good reasons, a petition for 
a rehearing should be promptly filed, and, if it is 
) meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized 
by this court.'' 
In terms the opinion now on file refused to pass upon 
the issue of adverse possession and estoppel; the two de-
fenses which controlled the decision of the trial court. 
We cannot therefore be charged with attempting to re-
argue, on this petition, matters heretofore determined by 
the Supreme Court. 
Furthermore the Supreme Court in its opinion now 
on file saw fit to go outside the briefs submitted by coun-
sel for the respective parties and, if we may be permitted 
to say so, briefed the case for itself. From that it must 
inevitably follow that in reaching its conclusions, the 
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Supreme Court did so without the aid of argument of 
counsel. In short, the decision of the Court now on file 
is bottomed upon a rule found in the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Montana in the ease of Hickey v. Ana-
conda C. M. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806, a case which 
was not cited in the briefs of counsel either for the appel-
lents or for the respondents. 
Conscious of embarrassment which must result in ad-
dressing to an appellate court an argument against itself, 
it is nevertheless necessary, when it is conceived that a 
court of last resort has based its rulings upon a wrong 
principle of law, to be critical in terms, and in this in-
stance our respect for the Supreme Court of Utah is only 
increased by the thought that if we are able by reference 
to respectable authority to convince it that it has fallen 
into error, it will promptly and cheerfully correct itself. 
I t is evident that the Hickey Case, supra, came to the 
Court 's attention from its own independent research. I t 
is equally clear that the decision heretofore reached by 
the Court in this case is based upon the principle an-
nounced in the Hickey Case to the effect that the title 
derived by patent relates back to the last of the series of 
acts required by state law to perfect a mining location. 
Language of that purport is, to be sure, found in the 
opinion of the Montana Court, but that it is dicta we have 
Mr. Chief Justice Brantly for it. We quote his concurring 
opinion in full: 
" Brantly, C. J . I concur in the result. I am 
in doubt, however, as to the time to which the title 
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by patent relates—whether to the date of the 
completed location, or to the date of discovery. X 
am inclined to think it relates to the latter. As a 
decision of this point is not necessary, I refrain 
from expressing an opinion/ ' 
In Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed. Sec. 783, Page 1921, that 
pre-eminent authority, commenting on the rule in ques-
tion, has the following to say: 
"According to a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Montana, in order to apply the doctrine 
of relation to any date prior to the entry, the date 
of which is inserted in the patent, a valid location 
complete under the state law must be shown, and 
that date is the date of the performance of the 
last of a series of acts required by the state law, 
i. e., the recording of the certificate. If this certi-
ficate when offered in evidence does not comply 
with the state law and is invalid, the date of its 
recording cannot be made available for purpose of 
relation. 
'' Chief Justice Brantly, concurring in the re-
sult reached by the majority, is of the opinion 
that it should relate to the discovery, and in this 
we think the chief justice is sustained by the 
weight of authority." 
As late as 1918 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit on an appeal from the U. S. District Court 
for Montana has the following to say respecting the 
Hickey Case: s 
" T h e earlier decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Montana were in line with the cases above cited. 
Butte City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397, 
12 Pac. 858; Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. 
434; Chambers v. Jones, 17 Mont. 156, 42 Pac. 
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758. They were overruled, however, in Hickey v. 
Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pae. 
806, the court there holding that if the declaratory 
statement was invalid, a location was not ef-
fected, and that in such a case there was no date 
to which the patent could relate antecedent to the 
date of the application therefor, which, the court 
said, was the first intimation to the government! 
that an attempt had been made to locate the claim. 
The court reasoned that if the locator did not pro-
ceed according to law, he initiated no right to 
which the patent could relate, and observed that 
of course the government, being the owner, might 
issue patent upon the showing which Congres^ 
saw fit to exact. In brief, the court held that the 
issuance of the patent was an adjudication only 
of compliance with the laws of the United States, 
and not of compliance with the laws of the state. 
The case stands alone in so holding. The reverse 
was held, as we have seen, in Mining Co. v. Tunnel 
Co., supra." 
Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana E. Co., 
248 Fed. 609, 613. 
In short the opinion in the Hickey Case appears to 
be one of those unfortunate decisions which appear every 
so often in many jurisdictions where the court departs 
from established principle and which accomplish nothing 
beyond working injustice in a particular case and embar-
rassment to succeeding generations until the harrassed 
personnel of the same court finally overrules the prece-
dent, or the legislature passes some act to give relief. 
Thus in Montana, as Mr. Justice Gilbert states in his 
opinion in the case of Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana 
R. Co., supra, at page 612 of 248 Fed. Ri.: 
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"In view of the harshness of the rule so estab-
lished, the Legislature at its session next follow-
ing the decision in the Hickey Case, enacted that 
the issuance of a patent for a mining claim shall 
be deemed conclusive that the requirements of the 
laws of the state relative to location and record 
have been duly complied with, and it validated all 
mining locations under the laws of the state.'' 
The case which Mr. Justice Gilbert refers to supra 
as "Mining Co. v. Tunnel Co." is Creede & Cripple Creek 
M. & M. Co. v. Uinta T. M. T. Co., 196 U. S. 337, one of 
the classics in the mining law of this country, and it is 
interesting to remark that in his opinion Justice Brewer 
approves both the text of Lindley and the text of Snyder 
on Mines. The language of the latter to the effect that the 
relation is "generally from the first act towards claim 
and appropriation,'9 is, we submit, clearly right in prin-
ciple. It is the energy, skill and perseverance of the dis-
coverer which the policy of our mining laws rewards, 
and when he is on, the scent the law protects his posses-
sion while he is verifying his prospects. 
If the patent issued to the McGuire is not only evi-
dence but conclusive evidence that it was a valid location 
prior to patent (and as to that there is no doubt) and if 
the true doctrine of relation is that the title acquired by 
patent relates back to the discovery and not to the com-
pleted location, and if it is a controlling factor in the 
determination of this appeal that a "discovery" was 
made on the McGruire Placer prior to the Valentine Scrip 
patent or even prior to Bentley's entry in February, 
1876, then it becomes wholly immaterial that the plain-
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tiffs' proof failed to show that the claim was staked or 
marked, posted or recorded. The only fact to be deter-
mined by the proof is the date of the discovery. 
Before further discussing that feature, however, it 
will perhaps be germane to refer to another principle of 
law which the Supreme Court of Utah has many times an-
nounced and applied. Thus, in Duggins v. Colby, 45 
Utah 335, 339, the Court says : 
' ' This is a law case, and we have no power to 
look into the evidence for the purpose of deter-
mining what the findings upon any particular 
question or phase of the case should be. That, in 
such cases, is the exclusive province of the court 
or jury, and all we have the power to do is to de-
termine whether there is any substantial evidence 
to support the verdict of the jury or the findings, 
or of any particular finding of the court. If 
there is competent evidence in this regard there-
fore (which we very seriously doubt) upon which 
the court could have based a finding respecting the 
measure of damages which we have suggested, yet 
it is unavailing to us, because, as pointed out, we 
have no power to make findings in law cases, nor, 
in the first instance, suggest what, under the evi-
dence, they should be. 
For the reasons indicated, the judgment is re-
versed and the cause is remanded to the District 
Court of Sevier County, with directions, to grant 
a new trial and to proceed with the case in accord-
ance with the views herein expressed. 
Of two things there can be no doubt; the case at bar 
is a law case (an action in ejectment) and the trial court 
made no finding whatsoever respecting a discovery on the 
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McGuire & Company Placer. Jus t what the reason for 
the rule, that in a law case the Supreme Court will not 
make findings, may be we do not presume at this time 
to say, but, that it is a dangerous thing to do without 
the benefit of argument of counsel is well illustrated by 
the opinion of the Supreme Court herein now on file. 
By referring to pages 10,11,12 and 13 of the printed 
reply brief submitted by the appellants prior to the oral 
argument, it will be seen that the issue, which the opinion 
of the Court now on file states to be the controlling fac-
tor in this case, was tendered by the appellants in the 
court below and objection by the defendants thereto was 
made. Then followed extended argument in which the 
appellants stated to the opposing counsel and to the tr ial 
court that the reason why they tendered proof of a dis-
covery on the McGuire Placer prior to and at the time 
the location notice was filed for record was to forestall 
the very theory upon which the Supreme Court has here-
tofore affirmed the judgment. To that tender defend-
ants ' counsel again objected, and when the tender was 
urged, because the argument might be made that the time 
of the discovery had not been shown by the plaintiffs, the 
defendants stated in open court, and it appears in the 
Bill of Exceptions (page 62), " W e are not questioning 
the discovery on the McGuire Patent. I t is not in the 
case. ' ' And t h a t ' ' Counsels' position is that the McGuire 
& Company Placer is wholly apart from this investiga-
tion and has no place in this case." (Bill of Exceptions, 
page 63.) And the trial court then informed counsel 
that he agreed with the position thus taken by the de-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fendants, but finally ruled, that the plaintiffs might, if 
they insisted, prove a discovery on the McGuire & Com-
pany Placer as such, at the same time refusing to permit 
the plaintiffs to show the character of the surrounding 
country, or that properties immediately adjoining the 
McGuire Placer were at the time of its location being suc-
cessfully operated as placer mines. (Bill of Exceptions, 
page 64.) 
Under such circumstances the appellants felt justi-
fied in making their proof of discovery as bald as possible 
and furthermore, under the authorities, as we shall pres-
ently see, it was impossible for them under the court 's 
rulings, to prove a discovery to the extent of the latitude 
allowed by all of the authorities. As stated in our reply 
brief under such circumstances we felt abused to have 
respondents in their brief in the Supreme Court even 
advert to the question of discovery at all, and if the 
the Supreme Court will re-read the respondents' 
brief (page 50) it will be observed that they renew 
their theory, which has been throughout, that the doc-
trine of relation is out of the case and so far as priority 
between the titles is concerned, the case should be decided 
on the theory that the Valentine Scrip Patent being prior 
in time of issuance must prevail over the later patent 
issued on the McGuire Placer; that having divested itself 
of title by the earlier patent the Government could con-
vey nothing by the later patent. 
I t was for the reason that the respondents stated 
in open court that they did not question the discovery on 
the McGuire Placer that the testimony, such as it is, which 
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was ultimately introduced in the court below, was not ab-
stracted in the printed record on appeal. And even when 
respondents' counsel adverted to the point in their brief, 
we did not deem it neecssary to abstract the record fully 
in our reply brief. We did not believe that the Supreme 
Court, under all the circumstances, would finally come to 
a decision on that theory, which the trial court repudiated 
and opposing counsel stated on the trial was not in the 
case and upon which the trial court made no findings 
whatsoever. 
Adverting now to the opinion of the Supreme Court 
now on file we find the first comment oil the evidence 
reading as follows: " N o evidence whatever was offered 
to show that the mining claim in question had been 
marked on the ground so that its boundaries could be 
readily t raced." As to that, we hope we have already 
shown that that circumstance is immaterial, because the 
true doctrine of relation is that title derived by patent 
relates back to the discovery. The fact that the claim 
was duly marked is conclusively proven by the subse-
quent issuance of patent. 
Commenting on the evidence as to a discovery, the 
opinion states, " There was nothing in this evidence to 
show what values, if any, in gold were recovered or by 
whom any discovery was made ." By referring to the 
Bill of Exceptions (page 65) we find the witness Gibbons 
testified, "They was working there and they used to 
pan gold. Mr. McGuire used to. I have seen him pan 
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gold down on the rimrock, you know where it went down 
into the gulch/9 Mr. McGuire was one of the locators 
of the claim and in fact it was named after him. There-
fore, to find as a fact that there was no evidence of a 
discovery by any of the locators is not sustained by the 
record. 
And when the opinion states that " I t is fairly infer-
able from the testimony that the gravels had been panned 
down on the rimrock as far as they could go before the 
location of the claim in question/' the implication, as we 
read it, is that the court finds that the claim had been 
worked out or proved to be a failure before it was located. 
As a matter of fact, all that the witness meant by his tes-
timony in that respect was that when they got down so 
far they encountered water and had to change their 
method of work. In fact, on reading the Bill of Excep-
tions it will be noted that the witness several times 
started to tell about the water encountered and the drain 
ditch that was dug to collect and carry off the water, but 
in each instance was stopped because his testimony in 
that respect might have gone far afield from the point 
sought to be adduced. 
As for the language in the opinion that there was 
nothing in the evidence to show what values in gold were 
recovered we respectfully submit that that circumstance 
in and of itself in none of the accepted authorities is a 
controlling factor of a sufficient "discovery." 
At the bottom of page 777, Lindley, 3rd Edition, the 
author states: 
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• "With reference to lodes and veins, Judge 
Hawley's definition seems to answer all practical 
purposes: 
When the locator finds rock in, place contain-
ing mineral, he has made a discovery within th£ 
meaning of the statute, whether the earth or rock 
is rich or poor, whether it assays high or low. 
I t is the finding of the mineral in the rock in place, 
as distinguished from float rock, that constitutes 
the discovery and warrants the prospector in mak-
ing a location of a mining claim.'' 
The rule adopted by the Land Department, Castle v. 
Womble, 19 Land Dec. 455, 457, is as follows: 
" Where minerals have been found, and the 
evidence is of such a character that a person of 
ordinary prudence would be justified in the fur-
ther expenditure of his labor and means, with a 
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a val-
uable mine, the requirements of the statute have 
been met. To hold otherwise would tend to make 
of little avail, if not entirely nugatory, that provi-
sion of the law whereby ' all valuable mineral de-
posits in lands belonging to the United States 
* * * are * * * declared to be free and open 
to exploration and purchase.' '7 
In the case of Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313 (cited 
by the Supreme Court in its opinion now on file) Justice 
Brewer, after quoting the above rule announced by the 
Land Department and after quoting Lindley 's text to the 
effect, that the true rule is that the facts which are with-
in the observation of the discoverer and which induce the 
discoverer to locate should be such as would justify a 
man of ordinary prudence, not necessarily a skilled 
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miner, in the expenditure of his time and money in the 
development of the property, states the rule generally in 
the following language, no more or no less: 
"There must be such a discovery of mineral 
as gives reasonable evidence of the fact, either 
that there is; a vein or lode carrying the precious 
mineral, or if it be claimed as placer ground, that 
it is valuable for such mining." 
I t would seem to be a needless expense to reprint 
in this petition what is already printed in our Reply 
Brief commencing at the bottom of page 10 and continu-
ing on to the top of page 13. We can not help believing 
that the Supreme Court, when reading that portion of 
our Reply Brief, overlooked its significance. The Bill 
of Exceptions, as there abstracted, shows beyond ques-
tion that when the appellants sought to introduce evi-
dence of a discovery on the McGuire Placer, prior to and 
at the time of its location, the respondents objected and 
inquired what the purpose of the examination might be. 
Thereupon, counsel for the appellants frankly and fully 
stated both to opposing counsel and to the trial court 
exactly what we sought to prove and the reason for it. 
In other words, we then advised the trial court and coun-
sel that we apprehended that the Supreme Court might 
take the precise view of this case, which it did take in 
the opinion now on file, and sought to introduce evidence 
to satisfy that theory by proving a discovery prior to 
and at the time of the location of the claim. I t was then 
that counsel for the respondents stated that they did not 
question the discovery on the McGuire Placer and that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
their theory was, that the McGuire Placer is wholly apart 
from this investigation and has no place in this case. 
But the argument continued and the trial court, although 
stating in so many words that he agreed with the respond-
ents, and saw nothing whatever in the theory and tender 
of the appellants, nevertheless, finally ruled, as will ap-
pear at the top of page 13 of our Reply Brief, that we 
could not show the character of the surrounding country 
nor could we show that successful mines were being oper-
ated on properties immediately adjoining the McGuire 
ground, but permitted us to show what our activities had 
been on the McGuire ground, prior to and at the time of 
location and no more. 
Commencing in the middle of page 9 of our Reply 
Brief, we quoted at length from the case of Cascaden v. 
Bortolis, where the case was reversed because on the 
issue of discovery the trial court had excluded testimony 
of the character of the surrounding country and of the 
operations of miners upon adjacent properties. 
At pages 774 and 775 of Lindley's 3rd Edition, the 
author quotes, from and cites a number of authorities to 
the effect that where conditions are similar to adjacent 
geological characteristics which had induced other miners 
to locate claims in the same district and which by con-
tinued development were found to be a par t of a well-
defined ore body, that was sufficient to justify a belief 
as to the existence of ore bodies within the limits of the 
ground located. And the author quotes from the Supreme 
Court of Idaho as follows: 
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"If a miner has discovered certain mineral 
indications which he has followed up with the re-
sult that a rich and valuable ore body has been 
developed therefrom, it seems clear that another 
miner finding similar indications and conditions 
on contiguous ground or in the immediate vicinity 
would be in a measure justified in following up 
these evidences with reasonable expectation of 
finding mineral deposits, and this is true even 
though the indications, rock and deposits found 
are such as the expert scientist, geologist and min-
eralogist in their finest theories tell him are not 
evidence of mineral deposits or even that they are 
evidences of the entire absence of mineral." 
In its opinion now on file the Court uses the following 
language: "An effort was made to prove by one witness 
that there had been a mineral discovery but in our opin-
ion the proof was wholly insufficient to establish the 
fact," citing Chrisman v. Miller, supra; Steele v. Tanana 
Mines R. Co., 148 Fed. 678. 
We have heretofore seen that all Mr. Justice Brewer 
said in the Chrisman Case is this, "If it be claimed as 
placer ground (it must appear) that it is valuable for 
such mining." 
We respectfully request the Court to re-read the 
Steele Case in connection with this petition for a rehear-
ing. As we read the language of Mr. Justice Gilbert, all 
the testimony before him went no farther than the fol-
lowing: 
" The locator secured colors of gold, and in some in-
stances fairly good prospects' of gold." 
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Another witness testified, that the result of his pan-
ning was such as miners are in the habit of calling good 
prospects of gold. 
Another witness found colors of gold in several pans. 
And Mr. Justice Gilbert says: ' ' The sum and sub-
stance of this evidence is not that gold had been discov-
ered on the claim in such quantities as to justify a person 
of ordinary prudence in further expending labor and 
means with a reasonable prospect of success, but that 
colors of gold had been found which were fairly good 
prospects of gold." 
Under such evidence the rule is well established that 
to constitute a discovery the law requires something more 
than conjecture, hope or even indication. (Lindley's 3rd 
Edition, page 771.) 
We now abstract the record commencing at page 64 
of the Bill of Exceptions. The witness, Michael Gibbons, 
was on the stand and testified as follows: " I know the 
character of the surface ground on the McGuire & Com-
pany Placer. At the time it was located it was a gravel, 
and at that time those gravels were being panned or 
sluiced for minerals, and minerals were recovered. On 
the west side they had a hydraulic working all the way 
from where the Bingham & Garfield Depot now is, down 
through the gulch where the so-called Maxwell property 
now in controversy is situated, and then to the north of 
the Maxwell gulch, they were working and used to pan 
gold. Mr. McGuire used to, I have seen him gold pan 
right.from the town on the rimrock where it went down 
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into the gulch. That was on what is now the McGuire 
Placer, but it had not been located at the time I am speak-
ing of. Coming down to the time that the McGuire Placer 
was located they were operating it when they located. 
They went down and drove a drainage ditch out, and 
right after they located—". 
Q. Mr. Gibbons, what I want to know, and this is 
all I want to know, is whether at the time the McGuire 
Placer was located the McGuire Placer gravel had been 
panned or sluiced, and gold values recovered. 
A. "Well , it was panned down on the rimrock as far 
as they could g o . " 
Two things must be evident from the foregoing tes-
timony, the first is that the work on the McGuire prior 
to and at the time of its location was rather extensive, 
and the other is that actual gold " v a l u e s " had been re-
covered. We submit that i t is a matter of common term-
inology in mining communities, to make a distinction be-
tween gold values and mere traces or colors of gold which 
may show as a result of panning. Anyway, that was a 
distinction that the examining counsel sought to make 
and if the trial court had seen fit to make a finding on 
the subject, we entertain no doubt that he wrould have 
drawn the conclusion from the testimony, that a valid dis-
covery had been made on the McGuire Placer prior to 
and at the time of its location. In announcing his deci-
sion Judge Wight said: 
" I f the question in this case involved only th£ 
property rights acquired under the patents, the 
Court might be inclined to the opinion maintained 
by the plaintiffs, that is, that the placer patent re-
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lated back to the original location and established 
priority, but the adverse possession on the part of 
the defendants is so clearly established that the 
case must be determined on that question." 
(Abs. 4.) 
In this connection it should be remarked that 
throughout the trial the defendants and respondents were 
consistent and treated the question of discovery as out of 
the case. Had they seen fit to cross examine the witness 
Gibbons respecting the preliminary wrork on the MeGuire 
which he testified about, it might very well be that his tes-
timony would have been qualified and to a more or less 
extent impaired. But the Court will note that the respond-
ents treated the question of discovery as out of the case 
and forebore to cross-examine Mr* Gibbons along those 
lines. Indeed they could not very well have done any-
thing else. 
In, its opinion now on file the Supreme Court says: 
"We assume as settled principles of law that 
the locator of a mining claim acquires a vested 
right therein by virtue of his location; and when a 
valid location of a mining claim has been made, 
which, by subsequent proceedings, is conveyed to 
the locator by patent from the United States, the 
title of the patentee, by the doctrine of relation, 
relates back to the time of location. The major 
premise for these rules, however, is the existence 
of a valid location." 
To -say that a chicken is a fowl rests on the premise 
that a fertile egg was laid from which it was hatched. And 
yet it is no more impossible for a chicken to come into 
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this world in any other way than out of an egg than it is 
impossible that a patent to a mining claim should issue 
except after a valid location. There can be no doubt about 
it, that the patent to the McGuire Placer must rest upon 
a valid location prior to its issuance. 
What, permit us to ask, is the reason underlying the 
doctrine of relation in any case? Is it not evident that 
its only function is to protect a right against intervening 
claims prior to the time the right initiated is perfected. 
That is the reason back of the doctrine of relation wher-
ever applied, and if the doctrine of relation goes back to 
the last act instead of to the first act it has in effect been 
made to lose its efficacy and the reason for the doctrine 
fails. 
The leading case in the United States is Gibson v. 
Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, where commencing at the bottom 
of page 100, Mr. Justice Field says: 
"By the doctrine of relation is meant that 
principle by which an act done at one time is con-
sidered by a fiction of law to have been done at 
some antecedent period. It is usually applied 
where several proceedings are essential to com-
plete a particular transaction, such as a convey-
ance or deed. The last proceeding which consum-
mates the conveyance is held for certain purposes 
to take effect by relation as of the day when the 
first proceeding was had. Thus, in the present 
case, the patent, which was issued in 1862, is said 
to take effect by relation at the time when the sur-
vey and plat of the location made in 1818, were 
returned to the recorder of land titles under the 
act of Congress. At that time the title of the 
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claimant to the land desired by him had its incep-
tion, and so far as it is necessary to protect his 
rights to the land, and the rights of parties deriv-
ing their interests from him, the patent is held to 
take effect by relation as of that date.'' 
As the Court says, supra, "The locator of a mining 
claim acquires a vested right therein by virtue of his loca-
tion." We of course, readily agree with that; but what 
we ask can an owner of a mining claim do after he has 
secured patent that he cannot do before patent? We say 
it positively, that patent gives to the locator practically 
no additional property rights. Thus, the owners of the Mc-
Guire Placer, if they had never secured patent might have 
maintained this action in ejectment on their location just 
as well as on their patent. Why then refer to the doctrine 
of relation at all, if the relation is back only to the com-
pleted location and the locator is bound to prove his loca-
tion and every step in the process irrespective of the fact 
that he has a patent. 
In final analysis that is the result of the rule an-
nounced in the Hickey Case. As heretofore shown the 
legislature of Montana abrogated that rule immediately 
after the decision was rendered. Later the United States 
Court in Montana refused to follow it and on appeal the 
Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the District Court. 
Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana R. Co., 248 Fed. 609. 
The result of Judge Gilbert's holding is that any in-
firmity in the location is cured by the subsequent issu-
ance of patent. Certiorari was asked from the Supreme 
Court of the United States and denied. (247 U. S. 516.) 
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And yet both the Supreme Court of Utah in its opin-
ion now on file and the Supreme Court of Montana in 
the Hickey Case recognize the doctrine of relation. In-
deed, that is necessary because it is established doctrine. 
The fallacy in the rule announced in the Hickey Case lies 
in this: I t recognizes the doctrine of relation and yet 
when it comes to apply it, gives to the owner of the pat-
ented premises nothing by reason of it. If the owner of 
a mining claim is bound to prove his completed location 
in order to enjoy the doctrine of relation, then he acquires 
nothing by that doctrine, because he could maintain every 
action to protect his property as a locator which under 
the rule he can maintain as a patentee, and under the rule 
his proof in each instance must be the same. 
We most respectfully urge the Supreme Court of 
Utah, before it commits itself to the rule announced in 
the Hickey Case to reconsider the question. 
In passing upon petitions for a rehearing in years 
gone by, the Supreme Court has frequently referred to 
the natural feeling on the part of the defeated party that 
the decision of the Court is wrong. And in that same 
connection the Supreme Court has said that they can not 
hope to convince defeated counsel, who must find solace 
in the fact that the responsibility for its decisions rests 
with the Supreme Court. We do not suppose that the 
Supreme Court would believe that we were very sincere, 
if we stated that we are not disappointed because of the 
decision herein now on file. But we have studiously at-
tempted to avoid in this petition and brief any language 
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which might be offensive or which the Supreme Court 
would have to excuse, if at all, as the result of zeal on 
behalf of our clients. We did hope and expect that a 
decision would be rendered herein which would clarify a 
number of doubts that exist in the minds of many lawyers 
at this bar, respecting adverse possession of the surface 
of mining claims. But what "greets us sa i r " is that we 
had studied the law of our case before the trial and real-
ized that the doctrine of relation might play an important 
part in the decision. By referring to pages 57-66 of the 
Bill of Exceptions, the Court will see how desperately 
we tried to prove our case as the Supreme Court now says 
wras incumbent upon us, and the Court will note that we 
met with nothing but opposition from opposing counsel 
and from the trial court; opposing counsel justifying 
their objection to the proof offered by stating that they 
did not question the fact of a discovery and that it was 
out of the case. 
And finally does it meet the ends of justice to ren-
der a judgment herein of affirmance, as has been done, 
instead of remanding the case* for a finding on the ques-
tion of discovery and relation. If we are wrong in insist-
ing that the rule in the Hickey case is not the law and if 
it was incumbent upon us to prove every act in the course 
of the location of the McGruire Placer prior to the Valen-
tine Scrip entry by Bentley, still in view of the fact that 
patent ultimately issued and it could only issue after no-
tice to the world, and opportunity to contest, is there not 
a presumption that we could readily have done that very 
thing, if the trial court had permitted us ? 
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I t cannot be said that the appellants have suffered 
an adverse decision on the ultimate merits. The failure 
of proof, if any, was not because the evidence was lack-
ing, nor because appellants' counsel were ignorant of the 
law. Every effort was made to inform opposing counsel 
and the trial court of the relevancy of our offer of proof, 
and it was then that opposing counsel stated, that they 
did not question a discovery on the McGuire Placer; that 
it was not in the case. (Bill of Exceptions, page 62.) 
Is it not competent for us to inquire, what did we 
leave undone that we ought to have done under such cir-
cumstances. In an action on a contract, i t might very 
well be incumbent on a plaintiff to prove that he had per-
formed on his part. But if when he offers so to do, his 
opponent states in open court, that the defendant does 
not question performance on the plaintiffs' part, is the 
plaintiff to suffer an adverse decision in a court of last 
resort because he did not prove that fact willy nilly? 
Had we assigned error, that the trial court improp-
erly restricted our proof of discovery, the Supreme Court 
might very well have said that the error if an error was 
not prejudicial because the excluded evidence could only 
have gone to prove an admitted fact. We know of no 
rule which requires an appellant to assign as error, the 
failure of the trial court to make any particular finding. 
All an appellant can do is to assign error in some find-
ing which the trial court actually makes, and as to that 
the record is as follows: 
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r
 Finding II. 
" A t the time of the commencement of this 
action and upon the occasion of the trial thereof, 
the defendant Utah Copper Company was seized 
in fee simple and in the possession and entitled to 
the possession of that piece and parcel of land 
mentioned and described in the complaint and 
sought to be recovered in this action." 
To that finding we assign error as follows: 
Assignment of Errors I. 
"The trial court erred in making Finding of 
Fact No. I I . Said finding is in effect a conclusion 
of law, but notwithstanding, the proof shows with-
out contradiction that the McGruire & Company 
Placer Mining Claim ions duly located prior to the 
entry of the west half of the east half of the north-
west quarter of Section 26, and prior to the issu-
ance of the agricultural patent to Bentley, and in 
consequence the mineral patent conveyed title by 
relation to the date of discovery and location.'' 
In the Creede & Cripple Creek Cases, both in Judge 
Sanborn's opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals and 
in Justice Brewer's opinion in the Supreme Court of the 
United States authorities are cited to the effect, that 
while logically a discovery must come first or prior to 
marking the location, it is nevertheless competent to lo-
cate first and make a discovery later; but no location is 
complete without a discovery and if discovery is made 
after location, for purposes of relation, the relation can 
not go back of the date of discovery, because there can 
be no completed location without a discovery. And it is 
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in that connection that both judges (perhaps unfortu-
nately) use language to the effect that the relation goes 
back to the completed location. A careful reading how-
ever, of both opinions shows conclusively that both judges 
recognize that the doctrine of relation is that it goes back 
to the inception of the right to-wit, to the discovery. 
We respectfully submit that under all of the circum-
stances reflected by this record the ends of justice can 
only be reached by at least remanding this case to the 
trial court with directions to make findings on the ques-
tion of a discovery on the McGuire & Company Placer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. L. LIBERMAN, 
R.A. McBROOM, 
GEO. Y. WALLACE, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
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